

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**MOLDAVIAN CRISIS RESPONSE: A STRATEGIC CONCEPT FOR  
EFFECTIVE INTER-MINISTERIAL OPERATIONS**

by

Lieutenant Colonel Aurel Fondos  
Moldavian Army

Colonel Edward J. Filiberti  
Project Advisor

This SRP is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

U.S. Army War College  
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

Report Documentation Page			Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188		
Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.					
1. REPORT DATE <b>03 MAY 2004</b>		2. REPORT TYPE		3. DATES COVERED -	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE <b>Moldovan Crisis Response: A Strategic Concept for Effective Inter-Ministerial Operations</b>				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S) <b>Aurel Fondos</b>				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) <b>U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Carlisle, PA, 17013-5050</b>				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT <b>Approved for public release; distribution unlimited</b>					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT <b>See attached file.</b>					
15. SUBJECT TERMS					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES <b>27</b>	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT <b>unclassified</b>	b. ABSTRACT <b>unclassified</b>	c. THIS PAGE <b>unclassified</b>			



## **ABSTRACT**

AUTHOR: Lieutenant Colonel Aurel Fondos

TITLE: Moldavian Crisis Response: A Strategic Concept for Effective Inter-ministerial Operations

FORMAT: Strategy Research Project

DATE: 10 March 2004      PAGES: 27      CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

This paper examines policy development and strategy formulation at the strategic level for the government of Moldova. The paper analyzes the Moldavian inter-ministerial and department strategic decision making and proposes improvements to the existing organizations, doctrine and processes. The paper highlights the current inter-ministerial and department relationships and uses several Moldavian Armed Forces (MAF) processes as a template to propose changes in how crises are managed at the inter-ministerial level for the full range of possible mission environments such as counter terrorism, MOOTW, natural disasters, and UN and NATO support. The paper proposed the following reforms: the refinement of the roles and responsibilities of the Supreme Security Council (SSC); the establishment of an inter-ministerial Monitoring Operating Agency to assist the SSC and monitor national and international strategic and operational environments; the development of inter-ministerial authoritative doctrine to guide both the chain of authority and specify the roles and missions for various strategic crisis responses; and the institutional adoption of a inter-ministerial Crises Action Planning Process with a corresponding standard format for Supreme Security Council Directives (SSCD).



## TABLE OF CONTENTS

<b>ABSTRACT.....</b>	<b>iii</b>
<b>ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .....</b>	<b>vii</b>
<b>LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS .....</b>	<b>ix</b>
<b>MOLDAVIAN CRISIS RESPONSE: A STRATEGIC CONCEPT FOR EFFECTIVE INTER-MINISTERIAL OPERATIONS .....</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>THE CURRENT STRATEGIC DECISION MAKING APPARATUS. ....</b>	<b>2</b>
THE SUPREME SECURITY COUNCIL ORGANIZATION.....	2
AGENCIES (MINISTRIES AND DEPARTMENTS) TASKED IN CRISIS RESPONSES. ....	3
<b>ORGANIZATION OF THE INTER - MINISTERIAL WORKING GROUPS.....</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>CURRENT STATUS OF MOLDOVAN STRATEGIC PLANNING FOR CRISIS RESPONSE.....</b>	<b>6</b>
<b>PROPOSALS FOR IMPROVING UNIFIED ACTION FOR INTER-MINISTRY CRISIS RESPONSES.....</b>	<b>8</b>
THE MILITARY CRISIS ACTION PLANNING PROCESS. ....	9
REQUIREMENT FOR A STANDARD FORMAT FOR SUPREME SECURITY COUNCIL DIRECTIVE (STRATEGIC GUIDANCE). ....	11
THE ELEMENTS OF SUPREME SECURITY COUNCIL DIRECTIVE (STRATEGIC GUIDANCE). ....	12
PROPOSED FORMAT FOR SUPREME SECURITY COUNCIL DIRECTIVE (STRATEGIC GUIDANCE). ....	12
<b>ENDNOTES .....</b>	<b>15</b>
<b>BIBLIOGRAPHY .....</b>	<b>17</b>



## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

During the preparation of this document I have received considerable assistance in both substantive and administrative form. I am deeply appreciative to COL Edward J. Filiberti, my Faculty Advisor on this project, for his guidance, advice, and editing. Also, I would be remiss without mentioning Director of the European Institute for Political Studies of Moldova, Nicolae Chirtoaca, for his substantial involvement in promoting new national security concepts from a totally different perspective and encouraging a professional discourse that led to many of the ideas included in this paper.





## LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

FIGURE 1. ORGANIZATION OF THE SUPREME SECURITY COUNCIL SYSTEM ACTIVITIES.	4
FIGURE 2. ORGANIZATION OF THE INTER-MINISTERIAL WORKING GROUPS. ....	5



## MOLDAVIAN CRISIS RESPONSE: A STRATEGIC CONCEPT FOR EFFECTIVE INTER-MINISTERIAL OPERATIONS

On November 9, 1989 the Berlin Wall fell to the onslaught of capitalism, democracy and freedom. "The Fall" struck the ocean of former Soviet Republics like a title wave: carrying with its surge of independence the hopes and dreams of peace and prosperity and the challenges of self-governance. Shortly afterwards, in June 1990, the Supreme Soviet in Chisinau announced Moldavian independence. A year later, on 27 August 1991, Moldova achieved formal independence. Since that watershed event, Moldova has been awash in difficulties as it struggles to transition to a market economy, democracy and self-governance. Nowhere has this struggle manifested itself more than in the strategic direction of the country. Beset by internal economic problems and undermined by the breakaway left-bank region of Transnistria (sometimes referred to as the Transdnestrian Republic), the government has struggled to develop efficient internal organizations and processes while simultaneously managing on-going routine affairs and internal crises. Nevertheless, Moldavian future development depends on the continuing maturation of its democratic institutions together with the development and implementation of efficient and effective processes and procedures for addressing its current and future national strategic challenges.

This paper examines policy development and strategy formulation at the strategic level for the government of Moldova (GOM). The Moldavian inter-ministerial and department (unified action) systems and processes are examined and proposals made to improve the existing Crisis Action Planning (CAP) structure within the Moldavian government. The paper highlights the current inter-ministry relationships focusing on the Moldavian Armed Force (MAF) and possible crises responses to the full range of possible mission environments: counter terrorism, MOOTW, natural disasters, and UN and NATO support. The paper concludes with a proposal to establish necessary Moldavian governmental organizations and processes necessary to conduct effective CAP and manage strategic responses. The analysis determined the need to establish an overarching organization responsible for monitoring the world and regional situations that would begin the decision making process, conduct initial assessment of the crisis situation, identify the lead ministry for subsequent planning sessions and eventually publish implementing guidance in the form of a Supreme Security Council Directive (SSCD). Moreover, the paper proposes the development of inter-ministerial authoritative doctrine, and the institutionalization of a military-like Crises Action Planning (CAP) process designed to produce strategic guidance in a standardized format.

## **THE CURRENT STRATEGIC DECISION MAKING APPARATUS.**

Strategic decision-making is a complex activity and within Moldova, it falls essentially on the Supreme Security Council (SSC) to serve as the coordinator for the principal participants in the national security and foreign policy decision-making process. These include the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defense, Internal Affairs, Finance, and Justice, and the Departments of Informational Security, Frontier Troops and Exceptional Situations. Strategic guidance, formulated and issued at the highest levels of the national leadership (SSC and the Moldavian government), is developed within a system that has specific participants, structures, and processes.

## **THE SUPREME SECURITY COUNCIL ORGANIZATION.**

The Supreme Security Council (SSC) was established in March 1992, as an advisory agency under the President. It acts according to the policies approved by the head of state. The primary mission of the SSC is to assist the President and develop policy guidance for his approval that directs all governmental ministries in ensuring national security.<sup>1</sup> However, the SSC does not possess any real power or ways to impose its policies on the agencies (including the military).

The SSC Secretariat normally prepares policies on various issues of interest and import for the President. These policies include matters for discussion at SSC meetings that have a direct impact on the success or failure of strategies across a broad range of ministries. The Standing Parliamentary Commission for Military Issues and State Security, set up by legislative authorities, supervises military activities. Its responsibilities and authority include powers to monitor and oversee national security and defense policies, defense budgeting, and the procurement and sales of armaments and military hardware.<sup>2</sup> The Supreme Security Council, currently composed of the Prime-Minister, Ministries of Defense, Foreign Affairs, Internal Affairs, Finance, and other designated cabinet officials, is the major organization charged with formulating, approving, and publishing strategic directives (guidance) at the national level.<sup>3</sup> Because each administration determines the membership, process and procedures for national decision-making, it varies according to the nature of a crisis, the personalities involved, and the types of decisions required. Within this ad hoc framework, the SSC system is constantly being modified and adjusted to accommodate the multitude of variables for each crisis. Notwithstanding the situational differences, each new administration usually develops its own standardized internal processes and procedures as it responds to emerging crisis and develops applicable plans and policies. The resulting "strategic guidance" varies substantially in form,

content and specificity from one administration to another and, within a given administration, from crisis to crisis. Standardization, if ever achieved, is done so tangentially through the experience and repetition of the ad hoc planning process.

#### AGENCIES (MINISTRIES AND DEPARTMENTS) TASKED IN CRISIS RESPONSES.

The SSC is the sole governmental organization that can publish directives to all government ministries. The participating government ministries and departments (inter-ministry working groups) respond to the SSC and, in turn, develop plans and direct their subordinate organizations in the execution of their portions of the strategy.<sup>4</sup> When guidance is incomplete, ministries must independently formulate their internal implementing instructions that may diverge from the strategic concept. Additionally, incomplete guidance may cause subordinate organizations to seek clarifying or more detailed instructions thus delaying or hindering timely actions. Thus, the effectiveness and efficiency of operations become reliant upon the internal communications channels of the various ministries controlling and monitoring their subordinate structures from the capital down to the operating elements in the field. In this framework, unity of effort among ministries is nearly impossible due to the diverse organizations, disparate operational planning procedures and differing communications channels. As an initial step to achieving the “unified effort” of the multiple ministries, Moldova published the “Concept of National Security.”

“The Concept of National Security”, outlines the layered organizations of the Supreme Security Council System (see Figure 1). As previously indicated, the Supreme Security Council Staff is the highest level within the system and is composed of the governmental Ministers. Responding to it and the President and Prime Minister are both the Inter-Ministry Working Group (composed of the Minister Deputies) and the Working Groups (composed of lower Ministry Officials). These decision-making bodies interact and respond to crises according to established procedures. Figure 2 depicts the lines of direction, supervision and coordination for most strategic policymaking activities and reflects the rather convoluted and redundant policy formulation process at the national level.

ORGANIZATION OF THE SUPREME SECURITY COUNCIL SYSTEM ACTIVITIES					
S S C  S Y S T E M		OFFICE OF MINISTRY OF DEFENSE	GENERAL STAFF (GS)	MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS	OTHER EXECUTIVE BRANCH
	SSC	MINISTER OF DEFENSE	CHIEF OF GENERAL STAFF (CH GS)	MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (MFA)	PRESIDENT, PRIME- MINISTER, CHAIRMAN OF THE PARLAMENT, MINISTRIES OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS, JUSTISE, FINANSE, DIRECTOR OF EXCEPTIONAL SITUATION DEPARTMENT, OTHER*
	HEAD OF THE COMMITTEE	MINISTER OF DEFENSE	CHIEF OF GENERAL STAFF	MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS	SUPREME SECURITY COUNCIL ADVISOR, MIA, MJ, MF, DISD, DESD, OTHER**
	INTER- MINISTRY WORKING GROUP	DEPUTY MOD	DEPUTY CH GS	DEPUTY MFA	APPROPIATE DEPUTY
	WORKING GROUPS	OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY MOD	STAFF OFFICER (J3/J5)	DESK SPECIALIST	MOLDOVAN GOVERNMENT MINISTRY ACTION SPECIALIST
<p>* A brief listing of other executive branch participants</p> <p>** Invited as appropriate</p>					

FIGURE 1. ORGANIZATION OF THE SUPREME SECURITY COUNCIL SYSTEM ACTIVITIES.<sup>5</sup>

## ORGANIZATION OF THE INTER - MINISTERIAL WORKING GROUPS




FIGURE 2. ORGANIZATION OF THE INTER-MINISTERIAL WORKING GROUPS.<sup>6</sup>



## **CURRENT STATUS OF MOLDOVAN STRATEGIC PLANNING FOR CRISIS RESPONSE.**

Inter-ministry cooperation during crises represents a major development for the Moldovan Armed Forces (MAF). Several years ago, the Directorate of Operations, Main Staff of the Moldavian Army (one of the components of the MAF), initiated development of a new concept for response to the full range of possible mission environments: counter terrorism, MOOTW, natural disasters, and UN and NATO support. Those requirements emanated from the internal and external (worldwide) operational and strategic environments. However, following the terrorist strikes on the World Trade Center (9/11) in New York City, USA and as a consequence of a corresponding Presidential decision, the National Army and other components of the Moldavian Armed Forces received very limited roles in the counter-terrorism mission area. Instead, other agencies and departments were tasked and assumed rolls that were not optimal for their organizations.<sup>7</sup> Consequently, the roles, missions and ministry resources will have to be adjusted to accommodate both the diminished role of the MAF and the increased responsibilities for other governmental ministries in this mission area. This sudden change is symptomatic of Moldovan unpredictable responses to emerging crises.

At the national level, the national security issues that have faced Moldova in recent years have been increasingly complex, requiring both inter- ministerial coordination and cooperation. Unfortunately, the Moldova Government has not effectively met these challenges. Part of the problem lies in the inefficient and rudimentary strategic decision making process and procedures that included convoluted lines of authority and responsibility, overlap and redundancy in many functional areas and an absence in representation or expertise in many others. This process is also complicated by an inherent mistrust of the participating ministries, poor internal and external communications, disparate organizational cultures and institutional intransigence founded many times on unreasonable or irrational parochial self-serving interests.<sup>8</sup>

Within this planning construct, a general standardized strategic decision-making process has begun to emerge with attendant deficiencies. For instance, as crisis situations develop, SSC members, accompanied by their working groups, initiate the decision-making process with an assessment of the crisis. However, during this phase (which on-occasion can be of rather lengthy duration) no agency is charged with monitoring crisis development.<sup>9</sup> This causes the assessment to continually lag behind the operational and strategic situation...sometimes significantly. Additionally, during some crisis responses, the SSC would designate a lead ministry that had little or no experience or resources to adequately address the crisis.<sup>10</sup> Both these difficulties are symptomatic of the SSC's lack of "real-time" information on the developing

crisis and lack of knowledge of the roles, mission, capabilities and resources of the appropriate response ministries. This was especially evident in recent Moldavian responses to internal natural disasters.<sup>11</sup> Both deficiencies could be resolved with the establishment of a national level inter-ministerial "Monitoring Operations Agency" (MOA) that could both monitor the crisis and collect and feed information into the SSC on the capabilities and responsibilities of the candidate response ministries. This will be addressed in greater detail later in the paper.

Another major problem is the wide differences in the ministries internal operational planning procedures (OPP) and communications channels. Once the SSC has published its strategic directive, there is a large difference in how each of the ministries develops, writes and issues supporting guidance for that directive. The Ministry of Defense, for example, has specific, well-defined internal OPP that address both deliberate planning and the crisis-action process as well as detailed reporting requirements that facilitate control. Also, the Ministry of Defense (MOD) has well developed standardized formats for issuing strategic military direction to the National Army Commander. At nearly every lower level, this format is the basis for the conduct of military operations in support of that guidance; it is trained in every military school, known by virtually every military member and is routinely followed at every echelon. It assures guidance is carried all the way down to the level where tasks are actually accomplished.<sup>12</sup>

Conversely, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, despite having a formal organization and specific message protocols, has no established format for issuing directives regarding diplomatic policies and strategies in support of the national guidance.<sup>13</sup> Other participating government and nongovernmental agencies may have neither formal organizational structures nor standard communications procedures. Consequently, MOD activities are much easier to direct and monitor, while other agencies may or may not have adequate chains of authority, communications, or reporting systems. These disparate organizational characteristics are aggravated by diverse agency cultures, philosophies, goals, organizational differences, political agendas, and competing policies that all serve to preclude voluntary cooperation. Thus, the current coordination of the various ministries and national organizations relies on a fragmented system with poor or outdated situational awareness, reluctant or misguided participation, and disparate and/or fragmented lines of communications.

## **PROPOSALS FOR IMPROVING UNIFIED ACTION FOR INTER-MINISTRY CRISIS RESPONSES.**

As previously mentioned, it would be useful to have a structure above the governmental agencies as a subdivision of SSC with the responsibility for monitoring the regional and strategic environment and providing information on the appropriate response ministries. This capability does not currently exist within the Moldova government. With the increased frequency of non-state threat activities such as terrorism, organized crime, drug cartels, etc., together with the need to monitor and respond to potential natural disasters, there is a real need for the establishment of a national-level 24-hour a day/7-days a week monitoring agency. The Moldova Armed Forces possesses the organizational experience to use as a foundation for both the monitoring agency and associated crisis action processes. Implementing the inter-ministry crisis response system should follow a five-step process.

The first step should be the formation of a Monitoring Operations Agency (MOA) inside SSC manned with personnel from Ministers of Defense, Foreign Affairs, Internal affairs and the Departments of Informational Security and Exceptional Situations. This agency should provide a crisis action focal point to the President/Commander-in-Chief and other members of the SSC. The MOA would monitor the world, regional and national environments, track and maintain communications with the principal Ministers and their Deputies, make decisions on the notification of specific members of the SSC depending upon the nature of the event or crisis, and provide situational updates of emerging or evolving crises as they occur. Upon direction of the President or appropriate SSC member, the MOA would initiate Crisis Action Planning (CAP). As a minimum this would include notification of the appropriate Ministry and SSC principal, and, upon direction of the President, the formation or the assembling of the SSC.

The second step is to establish an effective chain of authority to guide inter-ministerial action and the associated communications channels to implement the policies developed by the SSC. Since the President is ill suited to personally manage every aspect of every crisis response, the system needs to function without his constant intervention. This requires the establishment of an authoritative ministerial hierarchy, provisions for designating the lead ministry at the national level, and the publication of standard or doctrinal "supporting" and "supported" ministry-level relationships to guide all ministry involvement and participation. Because of the implications of these doctrinal relationships, there may be resistance to the establishment of such a hierarchy as the ministries may view themselves as "one among equals" for all crisis responses. However, unity of action is necessarily dependent upon the subordination of participating ministries to a lead ministry. This includes the Ministry of Defense

who may be in a supporting role for many types of crises. Nevertheless, the head of the lead ministry should act with the authority of the President to maintain organizational discipline, define responsibilities of participating ministries, and insure compliance to the appropriate concept defined in the SSC strategic guidance. In some cases, the lead minister will discover that resistance and disagreement are based on a lack of communications and information. This should be overcome by improved information dissemination through the MOA. However, part of the SSC system should include specific procedures for the rapid resolution of ministerial disagreements at the lowest possible level with the President being the ultimate arbiter of any unresolved issue.

The third step is to build an inter-ministry crisis response doctrine for similar “type” crises. This would include the development of a standard set of related objectives for the “type” of crisis, and define the roles and missions for key ministerial participation. The doctrine would provide an authoritative guide for crisis responses and address: operating principles; potential resource allocation or employment; legal implications or constraints; the creation or activation of appropriate executing organizations to include the formation and deployment of an initial assessment team; reserve key decision authority to the President or lead minister; and identify a menu of possible issues for SSC consideration during actual crisis management. Defining and agreeing on the possible ministerial roles and responsibilities before an actual crisis allows for objective analysis and rational decision making outside the usual time-sensitive and pressured crucible of crisis responses and facilitates the coordination and unity of action of all ministries.

The final step, in the establishment of an effective SSC system to guide inter-ministry crisis responses is the development of an internal crisis action process and the specification of a format for national strategic guidance. Here again, the MAF can provide a template to develop efficient processes, procedures and formats to guide multi-ministry actions.

#### THE MILITARY CRISIS ACTION PLANNING PROCESS.

Crisis Action Planning is an inherent part of all military operations and can provide a conceptual basis for inter-ministerial action. Codifying planning processes within the SSC system affords several advantages: initially it focuses all participants on an objective assessment of the problem; it requires the development and assessment of alternative strategic approaches; and it results in a political decision that all responsible ministries and departments had an opportunity to both contribute to and understand. Finally, it facilitates the execution by all the participating ministries and departments because it is self-disseminating and carries the authority of the strategic decision maker: in this case the President. Generally, an effective and

efficient inter-ministry CAP process would constitute the following phases which parallel the steps stipulated in US doctrine.<sup>14</sup>

Phase I – Situation Development. Whatever local, provincial or national agency identified a perceived national-level crisis event would immediately forward that information to the MOA for assessment and analysis. Based upon that initial assessment, the MOA may direct additional monitoring or contact the responsible Minister or the President with a recommendation to assemble the SSC for crisis action.

Phase II – Crisis Assessment. During this stage the SSC would assemble and assess the situation and determine if inter-ministry action was appropriate and whether the event warrants strategic action. Normally, the phase requires additional information, monitoring and fact-finding as the SSC struggles to get a handle on the true scope of the crisis and possible alternative responses. Here again the MOA would serve a valuable role in collecting information on both the possible lead ministries and on the crisis itself.

Phase III – COA Development. Based upon the assessment, the SSC may develop alternative courses of action. This could include different strategic objectives where there may be incongruence or conflicts with the possible objectives; different lead and supporting ministries or departments; possible involvement, exclusion or request for support from foreign governments; and/or different timing of response actions among many other factors. The SSC should develop the COAs in enough detail to permit an adequate comparison of both national and international impacts by all involved governmental ministries and departments. The analysis of the supported and supporting ministries would accompany the SSC recommendation to the President for decision.

Phase IV – COA Selection. At this point, the SSC has submitted the COA and the associated ministerial analysis to the President for decision. It is likely that the President would call a principals meeting to personally address the major issues identified in the analysis and get personal advice and counsel from his inner staff and political confidants. Phase IV ends when the President approves the COA and the MOA relays that decision to the concerned ministries. It is reasonable that the MOA would publish a Supreme Security Council Directive (SSCD) that would notify the lead and supporting ministries and departments of the COA selection together with any Presidential guidance captured during the decision process. The format and content of this guidance is essential for effective strategic operations and is further defined below.

Phase V – Execution Planning. Here is where the lead ministry or department would develop the detailed strategic concept for execution. Using the SSCD as a basis, the ministry would develop a detailed plan for execution. Likely, the SSCD would begin the CAP process for

the lead ministry/department and follow the general phases as outlined in at the SSC/MOA level. The lead ministry's detailed plan would itself require coordination with the supporting ministries and approval by the President since it would further define activities of the other governmental agencies outside of its authority. This phase ends when the President approves the developed plan for execution.

Phase VI – Execution. During this phase the lead and supporting agencies execute the plan. Execution depends not only the quality of the plan but also on how well the executing ministries and departments can react to changes in the strategic and operational environments. Consequently, successful crisis response requires continuous reporting, accurate assessments and timely strategic decision-making. Here again, the MOA would play a critical role in gathering information, developing response concepts, gaining Presidential approval and issuing guidance to the supported and supporting ministries to respond to the dynamics of the crisis.

#### REQUIREMENT FOR A STANDARD FORMAT FOR SUPREME SECURITY COUNCIL DIRECTIVE (STRATEGIC GUIDANCE).

Complementing the development and implementation of a strategic inter-ministerial Crisis Action Process is the establishment of a standard format for the issuance of SSC strategic direction. Formats have long been used in organizations to facilitate communications. Formats constitute a standard outline that encourages the “filling in” of key elements of information needed by the recipient for like task requirements. Formats in and of themselves do not assure quality guidance, however, they can help to insure that important or essential information is provided to the organization or leaders for specific types of operations and activities. Generally, formats are developed from repetitive execution of similar tasks and “capturing” of lessons learned from the accomplishment of those tasks so that future like operations can be conducted more effectively and efficiently. Formats also help communications because they establish the sequence and content of the guidance in advance so that both the senders and receivers know the elements and sequence of information and can cognitively process that information. The adoption of a standard format for strategic guidance by the SSC could assist in the formulation of a more complete strategy and improve the comprehension of that strategy by the ministries and departments required to execute its contents.<sup>15</sup>

At the strategic level, the role of comprehensive formats is even more important to effective strategic action. At this level, the inter-relationships, roles and responsibilities of participating ministries and departments are ill defined. Additionally, the strategic environment itself is complex and dynamic. Consequently, the need for a detailed format as a substitute for standardized procedures or complete inter-ministerial doctrine is critical. Quality strategic

engagements will depend, in large measure, on complete and comprehensive guidance contained in the SSCD. Conceptually, the elements of strategic guidance parallel those “functional areas” empirically derived through military operations and included in the military’s operational order formats. What is required is to raise those elements to the strategic inter-ministerial level.

#### THE ELEMENTS OF SUPREME SECURITY COUNCIL DIRECTIVE (STRATEGIC GUIDANCE).

Supreme Security Council Directive (strategic guidance) should provide the necessary information to the appropriate government ministries, departments and agencies needed to take coordinated action to achieve the desired strategic end state. Logically, this guidance should address the ends, ways, and means for strategic action. As a minimum, strategic guidance includes the purpose or “why” of the directed strategic activity together with the strategic objectives or “what.” This constitutes the “ends” of strategy. Correspondingly, the “ways” should direct and synchronize the activities of the appropriate ministries and departments for employing the “means” of diplomatic, economic, military, and informational elements of power in space and time to achieve the “what” for the stated purpose or “why.” In this way, a complete concept answers the who, what, when, where, why, and how. Conceptually, these constitute the total elements of a strategic concept.<sup>16</sup>

#### PROPOSED FORMAT FOR SUPREME SECURITY COUNCIL DIRECTIVE (STRATEGIC GUIDANCE).

Strategic engagements are, by their very nature, complex and profoundly different. Nevertheless, there is an opportunity to establish a standard format to help assure quality planning. Since the process at the strategic level is typified by convoluted coordination, political infighting, negotiation and compromises the establishment of a format for the product of that process may help overcome its inherent procedural deficiencies. Basically, the format can “drive” the process in that the writers are compelled to “fill in the blanks” to get approval by the responsible executive: in this case the President. COL Edward J. Filiberti (US Army War College faculty), in his article on the U.S. strategic decision-making process proposes a standard format for national strategic guidance. His proposed format is summarized below and adapted to the proposed Moldova SSC system. The proposed format includes eight elements: Strategic Context; Engagement Objectives; Engagement Concept; Marshalling and Sustaining the National Will; Command and Control and Organizational Hierarchy; Constraints and Special Authorizations; Strategy Review Criteria; and Strategy Contingency Options.<sup>17</sup>

- 1. Strategic Context.** At a minimum, this section should explain “why” an engagement is being considered. It should highlight the event, opportunity, or problem that led to the strategic action and why it is sufficiently important for the Republic of Moldova (RM) to act. It should contain an assessment that provides an overview of the entire strategic situation while addressing the major influences on RM alternatives. Content of this section could include RM national interests and values at stake, the nature and intensity of the threat, conflicting or competing national interests in other regions, and an overview of the expected responses of other major actors who may have significant interests in the region or crisis.
- 2. Engagement Objectives.** This section would address “what” the engagement is to accomplish. It would specify the selected strategic objectives and should logically follow from the strategic context discussion. It also should portray a clear cause-and-effect relationship between the objectives selected and the underlying rationale for engagement. For example, an objective presented as an “end state” condition would describe the social, political, economic, military, and geographical status of the nations to be affected by the engagement. If applicable, this section could include a hierarchical set of end states reflecting optimal to satisfactory completion conditions and an assessment of their corresponding risks. Desired or proposed end states should resolve the problems or realize the opportunities defined in the section on Strategic Context.
- 3. Engagement Concept.** This section would address “when, where, and how” the engagement is to occur and outline the concept for achieving the specified objectives. It would record the SSC’s concept of how the prescribed objectives are to be attained. This concept should synchronize all agencies in time and space, coordinating their efforts, sequencing phases, and establishing priorities. When appropriate, a subparagraph for each agency, describing its assigned tasks or its unique role in achieving the overall strategic objectives, should be included. This section might also include detailed instructions to the participating ministries, departments and agencies. For example, it might address to the military such issues as increased readiness, and pre-hostility force deployments; it might address to intelligence agencies a discussion of intelligence needs, in-country human intelligence sources, and area and opposing force analyses; for the Ministry of External Affairs it might address solidifying the support of allies, securing basing or transit rights, or assessing the positions of other foreign nations. The foregoing is only representative of the range and variety of information required when developing the concept for inter-ministerial agency responses to crises.
- 4. Marshalling and Sustaining the National Will.** This section would focus on the domestic political environment. It should outline the concept for gaining and maintaining public support for the strategy. This portion could assign supporting public affairs tasks to governmental agencies consistent with the strategic concept. It also could indicate those aspects of the engagement that are not releasable to the public and establish the time or event that would trigger release of certain specified information. Finally, this section should assess the anticipated public response to likely or expected incidents associated with the execution of the strategic concept.
- 5. Command and Control and Organizational Hierarchy.** This section would establish unity of effort for interagency planning and support at the national and international levels. It would establish lines of authority, responsibility, and reporting. It would designate the lead ministry or department for the various phases of the strategic concept and the event or time that determines when responsibility as lead agency transfers.



**6. Constraints and Special Authorizations .** This section could specify any limitations on normal agency prerogatives and provide the rationale for their imposition. The rationale should explain in terms of cause and effect the relationship of the prevented activity to the predicted undesirable outcome. Finally, it would specify those activities for which planning and coordination have been delegated and others for which decision authority would be withheld at the SSC level.

**7. Strategy Review Criteria.** This section would establish specific and tangible criteria that would initiate a reassessment of the strategic engagement. It would set timelines and milestones for such a review, possibly indicating degrees of success or failure. This part also would specify measures of effectiveness to be used in monitoring and assessing the performance of the participating agencies. Finally, it would articulate exit criteria short of mission accomplishment in terms of the overall cost, declining public support, competing national interests, or possible emerging alternative threats to the national security.

**8. Strategic Contingency Options.** This section would address branches and sequels for the central strategic concept. Branches are activities or phases that pose a high risk or have a high degree of uncertainty that can be expected and planned for. They outline alternative strategies that might be pursued based upon changed circumstances. Sequels are potential follow-on strategies that take into account the possibilities of success, failure, or disengagement without a decision. Branches and sequels are necessarily related to the strategy review criteria. At a minimum, this section would provide the exit strategy for the engagement.

## CONCLUSION.

As Moldova moves into the 21<sup>st</sup> Century, it will be faced with an increasing volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous strategic environment. Success will necessarily depend upon sound strategic decisions made by informed political leaders carried out by well-coordinated and adequately resourced government ministries and departments. The development of effective and efficient strategic decision-making organizations, systems and processes is key to this effort. The refinement of the roles and responsibilities of the Supreme Security Council; the establishment of an inter-ministerial Monitoring Operating Agency to assist the SSC and monitor national and international strategic and operational environments; the development of inter-ministerial authoritative doctrine to guide both the chain of authority and specify the ministerial roles and missions for various strategic crisis responses; and the institutional adoption of a inter-ministerial Crises Action Planning Process with a corresponding standard format for Supreme Security Council Directives will all serve to improve strategic decision making and immeasurable aid in achieving strategic success. Clarity of purpose, unity of effort and effective strategic responses are achievable within the context of these proposed reforms.

WORD COUNT= 5184

## ENDNOTES

- <sup>1</sup> Nicolae Chirtoaca, "Democratic Control Over the Military Sphere in the Republic of Moldova – Evolution, Current Status, and Outlook for Upgrading," *Euro-Atlantic Center of Moldova* (2001), 6.
- <sup>2</sup> Oleg Graur, "Civilians and Military In Defense Planning," *Euro-Atlantic Center of Moldova* (2002), 52.
- <sup>3</sup> Chirtoaca, 6-7.
- <sup>4</sup> Sergiu Gutu, "Crisis Management," *Euro-Atlantic Center of Moldova* (2002), 160-172.
- <sup>5</sup> Parliament, *The Concept of National Security*, The Decision of the Parliament Nr. 445-XIII (Chisinau, Moldova: May 1995), 3-4.
- <sup>6</sup> Gutu, 169-176.
- <sup>7</sup> Ibid. 176-178.
- <sup>8</sup> Gheorge Cojocaru, "Democratic Oversight And Control Over Defense," *Euro-Atlantic Center of Moldova* (2002), 22-26.
- <sup>9</sup> Gutu, 165.
- <sup>10</sup> Government of Moldova, *The Decision of the Government of the Republic of Moldova on the System of Warning information, Classification of Exceptional Situations of a Natural and Technological Character and the Enhancement of the intervention Capacity of the Public Administrative Authorities* (Chisinau, Moldova: Monitorul oficial Nr.30-33/269, 9 April 1998), 2.
- <sup>11</sup> NATO Civil Emergency Planning Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Center, *NATO's Role in Disaster Assistance* (Brussels, BE: November 2001), 15-16, 43. See also Gutu, 164.
- <sup>12</sup> Arcadie Barbarosie, Oleg Graur, and Viorel Cibotaru, *Good Governance: Civilians And the Military* (Chisinau, Moldova: Euro-Atlantic Center of Moldova, 2002), 87-95.
- <sup>13</sup> Graur, 59-60.
- <sup>14</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations*, Joint Pub 5-0 (Washington, DC.: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 13 April 1995), III-11.
- <sup>15</sup> Edward J. Filiberti, "National Strategic Guidance: Do We Need a Standard Format?," *Parameters* (Autumn 1995), 46-47.
- <sup>16</sup> Ibid. 47-48.
- <sup>17</sup> Ibid. 49-52.



## BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Boese, Wage. "An extra year for Russian withdrawal from Moldova." *Arms Control Today*, (January/February 2003): 1-2.
- Chirtoaca, Nicolae. "Security Sector Reform in Moldova." *A Self Assessment Study*. Chisinau: Euro-Atlantic Center of Moldova, (Spring 2002): 3-21.
- Chirtoaca, Nicolae. "Democratic Control Over the Military Sphere in the Republic of Moldova – Evolution, Current Status, and Outlook for Upgrading." *Euro-Atlantic Center of Moldova*, 2001.
- Dima, Nicholas. "The Moldavian-Dnestr Republic: A geo-political game." *The Journal of Social, Political, and Economic Studies*, no.24, (Spring 1999): 37-38.
- Filiberti, Edward J. "National Strategic Guidance: Do We Need a Standard Format?" *Parameters*, (Autumn 1995): 42-54
- Huttenbach, Henry R. "Old and new small nations in post communist Europe". *Nationalities Papers*, no. 26, (March 1998): 7-8.
- "Like Politics, Peacekeeping Is Local." *Christian Science Monitor*, (December 23, 1992): NOPGCIT.
- Moldovan Parliament. *The Concept of National Security*. Chisinau, Moldova: The Decision of the Parliament Nr. 445-XIII, May 1995.
- Moldovan Parliament. *The Concept of the Military Forces*. Chisinau, Moldova: The Decision of the Parliament Nr. 1315-XV, July 2002.
- Moldovan Parliament. *The Military Doctrine*. Chisinau, Moldova: The Decision of the Parliament Nr. 482-XIII, June 1995.
- NATO Headquarters. *NATO's Role in Disaster Assistance*. NATO Study. Brussels, BE: NATO Civil Emergency Planning Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Center, November 2001.
- Parks, Michael. "Moldova Vows Independence From Moscow." *The Los Angeles Times*, (August 28, 1991): 1-4.
- Quinlan, Paul D. "Moldova under Lucinschi ". *Demokratizatsiya*, no.10, (Winter 2002): 83-102.
- U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations*. Joint Pub 5-0. Washington, DC.: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 13 April 1995.
- U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations*. Joint Pub 3-08. Washington, DC.: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 9 October 1996,
- U.S. Joint Forces Staff College. *The Joint Staff Officer's Guide 2000*. National Defense University. Norfolk, Virginia, 2000.

